Workers and firms may bargain over general, multidimensional contracts; they may negotiate over health benefits, housing, retirement plans, etc. Substitutes, on the other hand, is the assumption commonly placed on firms' preferences to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. In this paper I show that, when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be embedded into a model of bargaining over wages.
their contribution in the least. I believe, however, that there is value in clarifying the relationship between contracts and salaries. One step in that direction is taken by Hatfield and Kojima (2010) , who investigate conditions on preferences over contracts that are weaker than substitutes and still generate stable matchings. My embedding does not work under Hatfield and Kojima's weaker conditions (see Section IIC below).
Future research should explain the consequences of the added generality of contracts over salaries in different economic environments. A paper that seeks to extend some classical result on matching to matching with contracts would need to sort out to what extent allowing for contracts provides a more general result. It may be that contracts are not more general, which would not by itself invalidate the exercise but would be an important feature to understand.
I. Embedding
A. Definitions I shall describe two models. The model of a matching market with contracts with substitutable choices is due to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) . The model of a matching market with salaries and gross substitutes in demand is due to Kelso and Crawford (1982) .
contracts.-A matching market with contracts is described by:
• (finite, disjoint) sets W of workers, F of firms, and X of contracts; each contract x ∈ X is assigned one worker x W ∈ W and one firm x F ∈ F; • for each worker w ∈ W, a utility function u w : X ∪ {~} → ℜ ; and for each firm f ∈ F, a utility function u f : 2 X → ℜ; all utility functions are one-to-one (preferences are strict).
A firm f 's utility function determines a choice rule c f : for A ⊂ X, c f (A) is the maximal subset of A according to u f . Note that since u f is one-to-one, c f (A) is uniquely defined. The empty set ~ represents for f the option of hiring no workers. For notational convenience, I have not restricted the domain of u f to contracts with f = x F , but of course we want f to sign contracts only in its own name; assume then that
For a worker w, ~ represents an outside option: a contract that is always available to her if she chooses to reject the contract some firm offers her. Suppose that if
A set of contracts A is feasible if, for all workers w, there is at most one x ∈ A with w = x W .
A firm f 's utility satisfies substitutability if, for any set of contracts A, and any two contracts x and x′, x ∉ c f (A ∪ {x}) implies x ∉ c f (A ∪ {x, x′ }).
The tuple (F, W, X, ( u f ), ( u w )) describes a matching market with contracts. A set of contracts A ⊂ X is individually rational if, for all x ∈ A, u x W (x) ≥ u x W (~); and for all firms f, c f (A) = {x ∈ A : f = x F }.
A set of contracts A ⊂ X is stable if it is individually rational and if for any firm f and set of contracts A′ ≠ A with
salaries.-A matching market with salaries is described by:
• (finite, disjoint) sets W of workers, F of firms, and s ⊂ ℜ + of salaries; • for each worker w ∈ W, a utility function v w : F ∪ {~} × s → ℜ ; and for each firm f ∈ F, a utility function v f : ∪ A⊂W A × s → ℜ; all utility functions are oneto-one (preferences are strict).
We can suppose that s is the set {0, 1, … l} of the first l + 1 nonnegative integers, for some l. 
A matching is a function μ : W → F ∪ {~} × s. A matching assigns to each worker a firm and a salary; I use the μ(w) = (~, 0) notation for when w is unmatched (unemployed). A matching specifies for each firm f a collection of workers with their corresponding salaries:
is thus the set of workers employed by f, and their salaries, in the matching μ.
) describes a matching market with salaries. A matching μ is individually rational if, for every f and w, v f ( μ
A matching μ is stable if it is individually rational and if, for any firm f and
B. Embedding
Let (F, W, X, ( u f ), ( u w )) be a matching market with contracts, and (F, W, s, ( v f ), ( v w )) a matching market with salaries. An embedding of (F, W, X, ( u 
) is a one-to-one function g which maps each x ∈ X into a triple
Let g be such an embedding, and A ⊂ X. Say that g(A) defines a matching if for any w there is at most one s and f with ( f, w, s) ∈ g(A). The matching defined by A under g is the function μ : 
, and an embedding g of (F, W, X, ( u 
is a set of stable contracts if and only if g(A) defines a stable matching.
The proof of Theorem 1 works by constructing an embedding. As suggested in the introduction, the Pareto frontier of contracts is "one dimensional": what is better for the worker is worse for the firm. So Pareto optimal contracts may be translated into salaries, with the better contracts for the firm defining lower salaries, and the better contracts for the worker defining higher salaries. The problem is that a firm's ranking over contracts might be affected by the firm's other hires. For example, consider contracts x and x′, both involving worker w and firm f. Suppose that x is better than x′ for f, and x′ is better than x for w; so we would map x into a lower salary than x′. In the absence of substitutes, this mapping might be affected by the presence of other contracts. However, since x′ is rejected by f when x is available, substitutes make sure that it will continue to be rejected when other workers and contracts are available. So the assumption of substitutes allows for the pairwise mapping of contracts into salaries to work globally, when all workers and firms are considered. The construction uses the salaries 1, 2, 3, …; but any other grid works in exactly the same way.
PROOF:
Say that a contract x is dominated for x F and x W if there is a contract x′ with
. Let X fw be the set of all contracts x with x F = f and x W = w that are not dominated for f and w. Note that X fw can be ordered by u w ; that is, I can enumerate the elements of X fw as x 1 , … , x ∥ X fw ∥ with u w ( x i ) < u w ( x i+1 ). Then I can write X fw = {(w, s) : s = 1, … , ∥ X fw ∥} with the understanding that (w, s) corresponds to offering worker w the contract x s in X fw . Note that s < s′ if and
Let K = max{∥ X fw ∥ : f ∈ F, w ∈ W } and s = {1, 2, … , K + 1}. For convenience, let's augment the contracts in X fw to include (w, s) with ∥ X fw ∥ < s ≤ K + 1. Assume that if s > ∥ X fw ∥ then, for all A, (w, s) ∉ c f (A). The embedding g is the mapping that takes x ∈ X into ( f, w, s) with (w, s) being the representation of x in X fw if x is not dominated, and into ( x F , x F , K + 1) if it is. 
The proof that A is stable in (F, W, X, ( u f ), ( u w )) if and only if g(A) is stable in (F, W, s,( v f ), ( v w ) ) is straightforward.
II. Discussion
I have omitted the alternatives that are worse than ~. Suppose that there is an embedding, where x maps to the salary s x and ˜ x to the salary
as x W = ˜ x W , which is incompatible with the preferences above. I should clarify that a deviation from substitutes does not by itself prevent the model with contracts from being embeddable into a model with salaries. The structure of bilateral substitutes is interesting because it is a deviation from substitutes for which existence is guaranteed.
D. Algorithm
Under the embedding, the algorithm proposed by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) is equivalent to the algorithm proposed by Kelso and Crawford (1982) . It is easy to see that they are equivalent because the two algorithms find the same matching: the firm-optimal or the worker-optimal matching, depending on how the algorithms are formulated.
Here, I want to show that the algorithms not only calculate the same matchings, but that they also work in essentially the same way: the algorithms take equivalent routes to a stable matching. The Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm starts by each firm f "offering'' the best contracts for f, and the workers sequentially rejecting offers. In the embedding, the best contracts correspond to the lowest salaries; and, in a similar vein, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm starts at the lowest salaries. In Hatfield-Milgrom, when a contract gets rejected, it is as if the salary for that worker is raised. Similarly, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm works by raising the salaries of workers who reject an offer. Broadly speaking, the steps taken by the Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm represent movements along the Pareto frontier of contracts-movements in a direction that corresponds to higher salaries in the Kelso-Crawford model.
The following example illustrates the point and, I hope, helps in understanding the nature of the embedding better.
Suppose there are two firms and two workers: F = { f 1 , f 2 } and W = { w 1 , w 2 }. Let X = { x 1 , x 3 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 } be the set of contracts.
The agents' preferences are:
The Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm takes the steps in the following table. I am using the same notation as Hatfield-Milgrom: R W and R F are the rejected contracts of, respectively, workers and firms. 
shall interpret the iterations so as to simplify the comparison with KelsoCrawford. In (0) firms "offer'' contracts x 1 and y 2 (they reject contracts { x 2 , y 1 , x 3 }. In 1) the workers respond by w 1 temporarily accepting x 1 , while w 2 rejects y 2 . In 2) the firms offer x 1 and x 3 . In 3) w 1 accepts x 3 and rejects x 2 . In 4) f 1 offers x 2 and f 2 offers x 3 . 5) w 1 rejects x 2 . 6) f 1 offers y 1 and f 2 offers x 3 . 7) the workers accept y 1 and x 3 .
We can embed this market with contracts into a market with salaries. Let the set of salaries be {1, 2}. The relevant part of the agents' preferences are:
So, firm f 1 prefers to hire w 1 at a lower rather than a higher salary, and prefers to hire w 1 at either salary over hiring w 2 at a salary of 1. I omit, for example, that for w 1 ( f 2 , 2) ≻ ( f 2 , 1) because firm f 2 is unwilling to hire w 1 at a salary of 2 (she prefers to leave the position vacant).
Kelso and Crawford's algorithm does:
The meaning of the iterations is the following. The algorithm starts with all salaries being 1. At this vector of salaries, f 1 demands worker w 1 while f 2 demands worker w 2 . Worker w 2 rejects the offer of firm 2 while w 1 accepts the offer from f 1 ; this is indicated by underlining the offer in the table. Since f 2 's offer to w 2 was rejected, the salary for that pair increases to 2. At that salary, f 2 decides not to offer to w 2 and instead demand w 1 at a salary of 1. The rest of the iterations should be intuitive. In any case, the steps are essentially those of the Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm, where workers' responses are included within each step in the Kelso-Crawford algorithm, and as a separate step in Hatfield-Milgrom. A general equivalence result is possible
